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ONCE BITTEN, TWICE SHY: THE SUPREME
COURT’S MISGUIDED DOUBLING DOWN ON
THE DUAL SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION TO THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT’S DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CLAUSE
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause is one of the most
revered provisions in the Bill of Rights, as it reflects and assuages “the
deeply rooted fear and abhorrence of a governmental power which allows
an individual to be subjected to multiple prosecution[s] for the same offense.”2 The Clause guarantees three separate constitutional protections:
(1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the
same offense.3 Moreover, for over forty years, defendants have been entitled to the protections against double jeopardy from the moment a jury is
empaneled and sworn in.4 Despite a period of halting progress and multiple setbacks, the Supreme Court eventually applied these protections to the
states through incorporation in the late 1960’s.5 Nonetheless, a curious exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause survives today under what is known
as the dual sovereigns exception (“the Exception”), where the federal government and the states are considered separate sovereign entities, such that
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Ray C. Stoner, Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty: A Critical Analysis, 11 WM. &
MARY L. REV 946, 946 (1970) (noting Double Jeopardy Clause’s purpose).
3 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (summarizing applicability of
Double Jeopardy Clause’s guarantee), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
4 See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978) (citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467
(1973)) (holding “[t]he federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn
is an integral part of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.”)
5
See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (announcing incorporation of Double
Jeopardy Clause).
1
2
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the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit one sovereign from prosecuting an individual following a prosecution by the other.6
Essentially, the Exception provides that “two identical offenses are
not the ‘same offence’ within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause
if they are prosecuted by different sovereigns.”7 The Exception has been
extensively criticized in light of the recent explosion of federal-state cooperation, the federal government’s provision of financial backing to state and
local law enforcement agencies, and the drastic rise in the prison population from the War on Drugs.8 Despite this criticism, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the constitutionality of the Exception in Gamble v. United
States.9 This Note traces the historical origins of double jeopardy protection,10 explores its centrality to the American concept of ordered liberty and
due process,11 and argues that the Supreme Court should overrule the Exception and instead deem it as: (1) an anathema to notions of popular sovereignty, (2) a manifestation of a perverse conception of federalism, and (3)
a patently unfair denigration of the rights of criminal defendants.12
II. FACTS
A.

Underlying Case

In 2015, a Mobile police officer smelled marijuana upon approaching Terance Martez Gamble’s vehicle during a traffic stop and prompted
6 See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1959) (finding due process does not bar state
prosecution following federal acquittal). The Bartkus Court suggested an exception to “the Exception,” whereby the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit successive prosecutions where the
“state prosecution was a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential fact
another federal prosecution.” Id. at 123-24; see also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382
(1922) (holding Double Jeopardy Clause only prevents federal government from engaging in successive prosecutions).
7 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985) (articulating dual sovereignty principle).
8 See Michael A. Dawson, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 296-99 (1992) (discussing negative consequences of Exception’s
continued existence); see also Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 599 (1961) (cautioning against exercise of separate
sovereign prosecutorial powers); Christina Gayle Woods, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to
Double Jeopardy: An Unnecessary Loophole, 24 U. BALT. L. REV. 177, 183-85 (1994) (questioning Exception’s post-incorporation longevity); Kevin J. Hellman, Note, The Fallacy of Dueling
Sovereignties: Why the Supreme Court Refuses to Eliminate the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 2 J.L.
& POL’Y 149, 152-53 (1994) (challenging Supreme Court’s federalism analysis undergirding Exception).
9 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019) (affirming constitutionality of Exception).
10 See infra Part III.
11
See infra Part III, sections D-E.
12 See infra Part IV.
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him to initiate a search of Gamble’s car; which ultimately yielded a loaded
9mm handgun.13 Gamble’s 2008 second-degree robbery conviction made
his possession of the handgun a violation of an Alabama statute forbidding
those convicted of violent crimes from possessing or controlling a firearm.14 Gamble pleaded guilty to violating the state statute, but federal
prosecutors later indicted him for the same single act of possession under
federal law.15 Gamble moved to dismiss the federal charge on the ground
that it was for the same offense as the one to which he had previously
pleaded guilty at the state level, thus impermissibly subjecting him to double jeopardy.16 After the judge denied the motion to dismiss, Gamble
pleaded guilty to the federal offense but also retained his right to challenge
the motion’s denial on double jeopardy grounds. 17 When Gamble subsequently exercised that right, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s denial and held that Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence allows
separate sovereigns to punish a defendant for the same criminal conduct.18
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Gamble’s appeal to determine
whether to overturn the Exception.19
See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964 (recounting facts of Gamble’s case).
See id. at 1964 (outlining history of Gamble’s case); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(a)
(2015) (providing no one “who has been convicted in [Alabama] or elsewhere of committing or
attempting to commit a crime of violence . . . shall own a firearm or have one in his or her possession or under his or her control.”) Gamble’s previous offense of second-degree robbery is considered a violent crime under to Alabama law. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-70(2); see also Brianne Gorod et al., Gamble v. United States, CATO INSTITUTE (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/publications/legal-briefs/gamble-v-united-states (discussing history of
Gamble’s earlier conviction).
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (9) (2020) (providing that it is unlawful for one “convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year [ . . . ] to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition . . . .”); Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964 (recounting history of Gamble’s case).
16 See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964 (explaining why district court rejected Gamble’s motion to
dismiss); see also United States v. Gamble, No. CR 16-00090-KD-B, 2016 WL 3460414, at *2-3
(S.D. Ala. June 21, 2016), aff’d, 694 F. App’x 750 (11th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019)
(adhering to dual sovereignty precedent).
17 See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964 (recounting lower court procedural history); see also Gorod, supra note 14 (discussing Gamble’s sentencing). By pleading guilty to the federal charge,
Gamble’s prison sentence was extended by nearly three years. Gorod, supra note 14.
18 See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964 (noting Eleventh Circuit decision); see also United States
v. Gamble, 694 F. App’x 750, 750-51 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (refusing to deviate from Supreme Court precedent on dual sovereignty).
19 See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964 (noting grant of certiorari); see also Gamble v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2707, 2707 (2018) (granting Gamble’s petition for writ of certiorari). The grant
of certiorari attracted extensive coverage and commentary, as it represented the first time in nearly sixty years the Supreme Court would fully examine the Exception. See, e.g., David Cole &
Somil Trivedi, It’s Time to Close a Loophole in the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Rule, ACLU
(Sept. 12, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/its-time-closeloophole-constitutions-double-jeopardy-rule (arguing that Court should end Exception, deeming
13
14
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Gamble’s attorneys set out the crux of their argument by explaining that the “[E]xception is incompatible with the text, original meaning,
and purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”20 Gamble accused the Supreme Court’s twentieth and twenty-first century jurisprudence of hollowing out the protections guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause as it was
written, and overriding core tenets of American federalism.21 Next, Gamble addressed probable concerns from the Court about its duty to adhere to
prior decisions by writing that “[s]tare decisis loses its force when a decision’s doctrinal underpinnings have been eroded.”22 Gamble further argued
against the power of stare decisis by highlighting the “dramatic federalization of criminal law over the past 60 years” as a “foundational change” to
the theoretical framework supporting the continued existence of the Exception.23 Gamble continued to lay out his arguments based on: (1) the weight
it “a betrayal of both the spirit and the letter of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Garret Epps,
There’s an Exception to the Double-Jeopardy Rule, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/gamble-v-united-states-case-doublejeopardy/577342/ (discussing importance of Gamble’s challenge to Exception); Matt Ford, The
Supreme Court’s Double-Jeopardy Dilemma, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/152565/supreme-courts-double-jeopardy-dilemma (summarizing
magnitude of case and history of Exception). In 1959, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier
Lanza decision by refusing to overrule the Exception, stating that doing so would be “highly impractical for the federal authorities to attempt to keep informed of all state prosecutions which
might bear on federal offenses.” Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959). While the
Supreme Court has analyzed the Exception since Abbate, those cases were limited in focus to issues like the Exception’s applicability to Puerto Rico, federal Indian tribes, and two states. See,
e.g., Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1875-77 (2016) (holding Puerto Rico, as U.S.
territory, is not considered separate sovereign); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004)
(holding Native American tribes are separate sovereigns vis-à-vis federal government); Heath v.
Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (allowing successive prosecutions under Double Jeopardy
Clause by two states for same underlying criminal conduct).
20
See Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) (No. 17646) (introducing argument in favor of overruling Exception); see also Woods, supra note 8, at
179-80 (summarizing proposed versions of Double Jeopardy Clause).
21 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 4-7 (outlining main arguments in favor of overturning Exception). Gamble posited that “[p]ermitting consecutive prosecutions for the same offense simply because different sovereigns initiate them ‘hardly serves’ the deeply rooted principles of finality and fairness the [Double Jeopardy] Clause was designed to protect.” Id. at 27-28
(quoting Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1877 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
22 See id. at 7 (addressing precedent in favor of maintaining Exception). Gamble argued that
the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the states has eliminated the Exception’s doctrinal justification. Id. at 8, 35-41 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 79-80
(1964) (overruling prior holding that one sovereign could utilize testimony unlawfully compelled
by another) and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (overruling “silver platter”
doctrine)).
23
See id. at 8 (suggesting Exception is no longer sensible where federal and state criminal
jurisdictions frequently overlap).
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of historical evidence and scholarship,24 (2) the shaky jurisprudential origins of the Exception,25 (3) the Exception’s incompatibility with the purposes of American federalism,26 and (4) the nefarious effects of the Exception’s continued survival.27
On the other side, the United States—in a full-throated invocation
of stare decisis—urged the Court not to “jettison[] [its] longstanding and
embedded precedent” with respect to the Exception.28 The government also relied on the express language of the Double Jeopardy Clause to support
its position, arguing that the “constitutional text expressly distinguishes ‘offences’ based on the sovereign ‘against’ which they are committed.”29 The
United States then shifted to a discussion of American federalism and how,
in such a system, the Exception is not at odds with the protections afforded

24 See id. at 11-15 (cataloguing long history of jurisprudence prohibiting successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns). Here, Gamble traced the rule against a second prosecution by a
separate sovereign to at least 1662, and argued that the rule’s enshrinement in English common
law should be instructive to understanding the Clause’s meaning at the time of its late eighteenth
century adoption. Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 17-19 (highlighting numerous state court decisions
affirming principle that a “decision in one court will bar any farther prosecution for the same offence, in that or any other court”) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Randall, 2 Aik. 89, 100-101
(Vt. 1827)).
25 See id. at 22 (questioning creation of Exception). Gamble argues that the seminal decision
that gave birth to the Exception “said nothing” of prior cases rejecting the possibility of the Exception, “of the widely known, traditional English rule,” and “why the framers would have rejected that traditional rule sub silentio.” Id. (citing Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 22 (1852)).
26 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 27-28 (citing Justice Black’s argument against
Exception’s promulgation). Notably in Bartkus, Justice Black dissented, writing that, “[l]ooked
at from the standpoint of the individual,” the idea that “a second trial for the same act is somehow
less offensive if one of the trials is conducted by the Federal Government and the other by a
State . . . is too subtle . . . to grasp.” Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). Gamble also invoked the Hamiltonian notion that the states and federal government are
“kindred systems” to question the perpetuation of a mechanism by which “successive prosecutions after an acquittal by a coordinate government that is part of the same national system” are
permitted. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 30 (emphasis added) (citing THE FEDERALIST
NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton)).
27 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 28 (discussing practical implications of Exception); see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1985) (presenting important precedent).
One of the most significant double jeopardy decisions came in 1985 when the defendant in Heath
was tried in Georgia and sentenced to life in prison. Heath, 474 U.S. at 84-85. However, the defendant was then permissibly tried again in Alabama and sentenced to death—all for the same
underlying crime. Heath, 474 U.S. at 84-85.
28 See Brief for the United States at 8, Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) (No.
17-646) (summarizing main argument). “An unbroken line of [the] Court’s decisions, whose
origin reaches back nearly two centuries, has correctly understood the violation of a state law and
the violation of a federal law as distinct ‘offence[s]’ under the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Id. at 6.
29 See id. at 6 (discussing meaning of Double Jeopardy Clause). The United States further
argued that the “federalist structure of the Constitution likewise dictates that offenses against the
laws of the several States and the United States are not ‘the same.’” Id.
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by the Double Jeopardy Clause.30 The Government also rejected Gamble’s
argument that the continued existence of the Exception threatens criminal
defendants’ liberty interests, and noted that “[t]he necessary consequence
of preserving liberty by dividing power between dual sovereigns is dual
regulation.”31
The United States concluded by discussing several potential scenarios it deemed constitutionally unworkable if the Exception was overturned, including the denial to a State of “its power to enforce its criminal
laws because another State has won the race to the courthouse.”32 The
Government warned that this scenario “would be a shocking and untoward
deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the States to maintain
peace and order within their confines.”33 The Government then warned of
the practical consequences that would result from overruling the Exception,
and referenced one of the key cases in Double Jeopardy jurisprudence to
aver that “if the States are free to prosecute criminal acts violating their
laws, and the resultant state prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on
the same acts, federal law enforcement [would] necessarily be hindered.”34
Ultimately, in Gamble, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in favor of
maintaining the Exception.35 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito rejected Gamble’s argument, and found that the historical evidence Gamble’s legal team presented was “feeble” in the face of “the [Double Jeopardy]
Clause’s text, other historical evidence, and 170 years of precedent.”36
Subsequently, Justice Alito dispensed with Gamble’s argument regarding
the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, writing that “where there are

See id. at 14-18 (arguing Exception’s recognition of distinction between federal and state
offences advances federalism principles). The United States argued that, because the several
states and the United States “‘derive power from different sources,’ each from the organic law
that established it,” both “ha[ve] the power, inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine
what shall be an offense against its authority and to punish such offenses, and in doing so each ‘is
exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.’” Id. at 15 (quoting United States v. Lanza,
260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)) (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978)).
31 See id. at 16 (discussing dangers of Gamble’s proposed conflation of federalism and liberty interests).
32 See id. at 18 (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985)) (arguing that overturning
Exception would deprive states of their sovereign powers).
33 Brief for the United States, supra note 28, at 18 (quoting Heath, 474 U.S. at 93) (noting
precedent articulating paramount prerogative of states to create and enforce their own criminal
codes).
34 See id. at 29 (quoting Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959)) (expressing concern regarding effects of overruling Exception with respect to effective law enforcement).
35 See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1966 (2019) (announcing Court’s ruling).
36
See id. at 1964 (explaining Court has “long held that a crime under one sovereign’s laws is
not ‘the same offence’ as a crime under the laws of another sovereign.”)
30
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two sovereigns, there are two laws, and two ‘offences.’”37 Thereafter, Justice Alito took cues from the United States’ arguments in his discussion of
the federalism implications of the Exception: “A close look at [Supreme
Court Double Jeopardy jurisprudence] reveals how fidelity to the Double
Jeopardy Clause’s text does more than honor the formal difference between
two distinct criminal codes. It honors the substantive differences between
the interests that two sovereigns can have in punishing the same act.”38
In a compelling dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg boldly criticized the majority for its “adherence to th[e] misguided doctrine [of the
Exception].”39 Justice Ginsburg continued by responding to the majority’s
discussion of federalism and the sovereignty implications thereof, writing
that: “[The Exception] treats governments as sovereign, with state power to
prosecute carried over from the years predating the Constitution. In the system established by the Federal Constitution, however, ‘ultimate sovereignty’ resides in the governed.”40 With heavy reliance on the Federalist writings of Alexander Hamilton, Justice Ginsburg inveighed against the
Exception’s continued existence for its virtual guarantee of not “shor[ing]
up people’s rights.”41 Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion was also in accord with many of the arguments Gamble advanced—she rejected the postincorporation existence of the Exception and balked at the power of stare
decisis in both the face of questionable legal analysis and changing circumstances in the reality of criminal law enforcement.42
In a separate dissent, Justice Gorsuch predicated his disagreement
with the majority on a plea for empathy, writing that “[a] free society does
not allow its government to try the same individual for the same crime until
it’s happy with the result.”43 In sharp contrast to Justice Alito, Justice GorSee id. at 1965 (citing Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
See id. at 1966 (emphasis added) (finding no reason to abandon sovereign-specific reading
of Double Jeopardy Clause).
39 See id. at 1989 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (articulating primary disagreement with majority).
40 See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1990 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Arizona State Leg. v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 820 (2015)) (accusing majority of overlooking core principles of federalism).
41 See id. at 1991(2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (contending that Exception perniciously
“invokes federalism to withhold liberty”).
42 See id. at 1991-93 (arguing Exception’s post-incorporation survival “enable[s] federal and
state prosecutors, proceeding one after the other, to expose defendants to double jeopardy”). Justice Ginsburg further wrote that “[i]ncorporation of the [Double Jeopardy] Clause as a restraint on
action by the States . . . has rendered the [Exception] obsolete.” Id. at 1991(citing Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969)); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)
(noting stare decisis “is not an inexorable command”).
43
See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (expressing
disdain for majority’s endorsement of Exception).
37
38
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such interpreted the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause in a very
straightforward manner, contending that the Exception defies all foundational principles of the Fifth Amendment.44 Justice Gorsuch further attacked the majority for its invocation of the power of stare decisis in affirming the Exception’s existence and for its failure to properly consider
the merits of Gamble’s arguments.45
C.

The Federalization Of Criminal Laws

In the early case of Fox v. Ohio, the Supreme Court justices indicated that successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns would be constitutionally permissible, and based their finding on an understanding that
such prosecutions would occur in only the most exceptional of circumstances.46 At the time of the Fox decision, such thinking was perfectly sensible; in the mid-nineteenth century, the federal and state criminal justice
systems existed and operated almost wholly independent of one another
and rarely, if ever, overlapped.47 Even as late as the mid-1960s, the situation was such that Justice White reasonably noted that “the States still bear
primary responsibility in this country for the administration of the criminal
law” and that “most crimes . . . are matters of local concern . . . .”48
Today, the situation is drastically different, and from one scholar’s
perspective: “the federal government has [now] duplicated virtually every

See id. (finding “no meaningful support in the text of the Constitution, its original public
meaning, structure, or history” for existence of Exception).
45 See id. at 2005-06 (indicating that unquestioned faith in stare decisis would leave Court
“still abiding grotesque errors” made in past decisions); see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (describing
Court’s tendencies when cases involve Constitution and corrective legislation is “practically impossible”).
44

[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, th[e] [Supreme C]ourt has often overruled its earlier decisions . . . [and] bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning,
recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.
Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406-08 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
46 See Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 435 (1847) (observing relative rarity of successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns).
47 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1138-40 (1995) (discussing historical federal and state government
law enforcement roles).
48
See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 96 (1964) (White, J., concurring) (suggesting importance of criminal law enforcement to states’ viability in federalist system).
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major state crime.”49 The advent of the federal government’s role in the
promulgation and enforcement of criminal offenses is of recent vintage,
too, with a 1998 study finding that “of all federal crimes enacted since
1865, over forty percent have been created since 1970.”50 As such, the
“degree of cooperation between state and federal officials in criminal law
enforcement has . . . reached unparalleled levels.”51 Gamble summarized
the serious threat posed to the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause
by such federalization of criminal law, cautioning “[such federalization]
creates more opportunities for successive prosecutions.”52 As early as
1964, the Court sounded the alarm over the potential for abuse of and disregard for criminal defendant rights given the “age of ‘cooperative federalism,’ where the Federal and State Governments are waging a united front
against many types of criminal activity.”53
Cooperation between federal and state law enforcement departments, agencies, and personnel is most prevalent in areas related to terrorism and drug trafficking.54 In the face of such extensive cooperation, even
49 See Edwin Meese, III, Big Brother on the Beat: The Expanding Federalization of Crime, 1
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 22 (1997) (noting that federalization of crime provides additional opportunities for successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns); see also Brickey, supra note 47, at
1140-45 (charting expansion of federal criminal laws); Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159,
1164-92 (1995) (analyzing rise of duplicative criminal offenses and advent of federal-state joint
task forces).
50 See James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law, AM. BAR. ASS’N, 1, 2
(1998), https://perma.cc/S5LM-VDHP (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (demonstrating dramatic increase in number of federal criminal offenses).
51 United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 499 (2d Cir. 1995) (warning this level of cooperation “should cause one to wonder whether it makes much sense to maintain the fiction that federal and state governments are so separate in their interests that the [Exception] is universally needed to protect one from the other.”); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 20, at 44 (contending nearly every offense may now be prosecuted at both state and federal
level).
52 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 44-45 (decrying consequences of increased federalization of criminal law).
53 See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-56 (noting advent of federal and state cooperation in criminal
law enforcement).
54 See State and Local Task Forces, DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/state-andlocal-task-forces (last visited Oct. 15, 2020) (“In 2016, the DEA State and Local Task Force Program managed 271 state and local task forces . . . These task forces are staffed by over 2,200
DEA special agents and over 2,500 state and local officers.”); see also Dawson, supra note 8, at
297-98 (summarizing federal-state cooperation with respect to drug crimes); Guerra, supra note
49, at 1182-85 (summarizing War on Drugs-fueled expansion of joint task forces); Joint Terrorism
Task
Forces,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-forces (last visited Oct. 15, 2020)
(“The first [Joint Terrorism Task Force] was established in New York City in 1980. Today there
are about 200 task forces around the country, including at least one in each of the FBI’s 56 field
offices, with hundreds of participating state, local, and federal agencies.”).
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the federal government has acknowledged that some obstacle is required
“to protect ‘the individual from any unfairness associated with needless
multiple prosecutions.’”55 The federal government codified that obstacle,
known as the Petite policy, following a Supreme Court decision in 1960.56
Nevertheless, the Petite policy is the subject of much criticism; for instance, a Tenth Circuit decision highlighted the Petite policy’s lack of substantive protections and noted that the policy’s discrepancies have been
widely recognized across circuits.57 Courts and commentators alike have
criticized the policy’s application for being “erratic and unpredictable.”58
Moreover, defendants who find themselves in situations like Gamble’s are
prevented from raising such arguments, because “the Petite policy, [as] an
internal policy of the Justice Department, is not to be enforced against the
government.”59 Additionally, as Gamble argued, the Petite policy is strictly
discretionary, meaning that “an individual’s constitutional right not to be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense hinges on an individual prosecutor’s secretive application of a discretionary and indeterminate policy.”60
55 Brief for the United States, supra note 28, at 54 (quoting Rinaldi v. United States, 434
U.S. 22, 31 (1977)) (noting Department of Justice policy designed to limit frequency of successive prosecutions).
56 See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530 (1960) (explaining “it is the general policy
of the Federal Government ‘that several offenses arising out of a single transaction should be alleged and tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions . . . .’”); Brief
for the United States, supra note 28, at 54 (summarizing policy goals advanced by Petite policy).
In essence, the policy “precludes” a successive federal prosecution based on “substantially the
same act(s) or transactions involved” in a prior proceeding, and requires approval from “a senior
Department of Justice official for such a prosecution to proceed.” Brief for the United States,
supra note 28, at 54 (quoting Justice Manual, §9-2.031(A)).
57 See United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1120 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 1978)) ( “The problem for
Barrett is that we have held, as have many other circuits, that the Petite policy ‘is merely a
housekeeping provision of the Department’ that, ‘at most,’ serves as “a guide for the use of the
Attorney General and the United States Attorneys in the field,’ and thus does not confer any enforceable rights upon criminal defendants.”); see also United States v. Gruttadauria, 439 F. Supp.
2d 240, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718,
725 (2d Cir. 1984)) (noting that it “is well-settled that the Petite policy ‘affords defendants no
substantive rights’” but is “‘merely an internal guideline for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, not subject to judicial review.’”)
58 See, e.g., United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 673 (W.D. Va. 1991) (noting that
prosecutor’s decisions were “in sharp contrast to” typical Petite policy practices); Jon J. Jensen &
Kerry S. Rosenquist, Satisfaction of a Compelling Governmental Interest or Simply Two Convictions for the Price of One?, 69 N.D. L. REV. 915, 927 (1993) (criticizing inconsistency in policy’s
application); Dawson, supra note 8, at 293 (calling Petite policy an “incomplete limitation”).
59 See United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1003 n.19 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added)
(illustrating limitations of Petite policy).
60 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 48 (urging Court to deviate from stare decisis
and discredit Petite policy); see also Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965) (“[T]he
mischievous consequences to litigants and courts alike from the perpetuation of an unworkable
rule are too great.”)
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III. HISTORY
The Double Jeopardy Clause, as “the oldest of all the Bill of Rights
guarantees,” generally enjoys a very positive reputation.61 The principle is
now firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence, but protections against
double jeopardy existed long before James Madison submitted the initial
drafts of what eventually became the Fifth Amendment to the First Congress in 1789.62
A.

Ancient Athens And Rome

As Justice Hugo Black recognized: “[f]ear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct . . . [has roots
that] run deep into Greek and Roman times.”63 Despite the rather vague
nature of his statement, Justice Black’s claim is well-supported by an examination of early law in both societies.64 In Athens, for example, the law
provided that once tried, a person could not be retried on the same charge.65
One scholar’s thorough analysis of prosecutions in ancient Athens found
that, by the latter half of the fifth century B.C., the “main concern of a man
brought into court was to win a verdict by one means or another, for once
tried he could not be prosecuted again on the same charge . . . .”66 Moreover, Rome adopted numerous Greek traditions, and protecting against double jeopardy was certainly among them.67 Such protections were found in
61 See George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. REV. 827,
828 (1988) (discussing immense value society and courts have bestowed upon protection against
double jeopardy).
62 See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (calling protection
against double jeopardy “one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization”).
63 See id. at 151-52 (noting long history of protections against double jeopardy).
64
See David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double
Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 198 (2005) (examining early Greek and Roman
double jeopardy protections); see also Jay A. Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 283, 283-84 (1963) (noting that despite idiosyncrasies of their legal systems, “[t]he
principle of double jeopardy was not entirely unknown to the Greeks and Romans”).
65 See Thomas, supra note 61, at 836 (articulating early examples of fundamental double
jeopardy principles); DEMOSTHENES, Against Leptines, in OLYNTHIACS, PHILIPPICS, MINOR
PUBLIC SPEECHES, SPEECH AGAINST LEPTINES, XX § 147, at 589 (J.H. Vince trans., Harvard
Univ. Press eds., 1998) (1930) (stating that “the laws forbids the same man to be tried twice on
the same issue”).
66 See ROBERT J. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS: THE GENESIS
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 195 (Chicago University Press eds.,1927) (emphasis added) (noting
early emergence of bars against successive prosecutions).
67 See 2 JAMES LEIGH STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, PROBLEMS OF THE ROMAN CRIMINAL LAW
154-60 (Oxford, Clarendon Press ed.,1912) (summarizing trial and appellate procedure rules,
rights, and limitations on state power).
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both the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire; in the former, “a magistrate’s acquittal barred further proceedings of any kind.”68 As the Republic
crumbled and an empire emerged in its stead, the sovereignty of the people
was predictably impaired.69 Nevertheless, protections against double jeopardy were not wholly absent from the Roman Empire and were, in fact,
routinely enhanced during the first five centuries of its existence.70 Early
Roman emperors undoubtedly challenged the strength of these protections,
but they reemerged by the turn of the third century—albeit with conditions
attached.71 However, this relatively weak period of double jeopardy protections was short-lived; in the middle of the sixth century, Emperor Justinian I promulgated the compendium of jurisprudential writings known as the
Digest of Justinian, which recognized that “[t]he governor must not allow a
man to be charged with the same offenses of which he has already been acquitted.”72 The Digest further states that “a person cannot be charged on
account of the same crime under several statutes.”73
B.

Religious Laws And Writings

As the Roman Empire approached its mid-fifteenth century end,
canonical law began developing rapidly and contained its own prohibitions
against double jeopardy.74 In 1234, Pope Gregory IX promulgated a col-

68 See GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 73 (N.Y.U
Press eds.,1998) (highlighting existence of double jeopardy protections in Republican Rome).
69 See id. (noting effects of shift from Republic to Empire).
70 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 199-200 (tracing evolution of double jeopardy protections
in early Roman Empire).
71 See id. at 199 (recounting instance where Emperor Tiberius attempted to undermine double jeopardy protections); see also THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS 4.17, in 1 IULIUS PAULUS, THE
CIVIL LAW 323 (S.P. Scott trans., 1973) (“[A]fter a public acquittal, a defendant can again be
prosecuted by his informer within thirty days, but after that time this cannot be done.”)
72 See DIG. 48.2.7.2 (Ulpian, Duties of Proconsuls 7), in 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 311
(Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 1985) (summarizing Justinian-era double jeopardy protections).
The principles expounded upon in the Digest of Justinian, although important, protected individuals from being subjected to double jeopardy by only the same accuser. Id.; 2 CHARLES PHINEAS
SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 486 (New Haven Law Book Co. eds., 2d ed.
1922) (“[A]ny Roman citizen or subject, desiring to cause anybody to be prosecuted criminally,
could apply to the presiding judge of the appropriate court for permission to make an accusation
against the alleged offender.”) It is important to note that, under the laws of the Roman Empire at
this time, criminal prosecutions were typically initiated by individuals, not the state. Sherman,
supra note 72, at 486; see also Rudstein, supra note 64, at 200 (describing how early Roman Empire criminal prosecutions were initiated).
73 See DIG. 48.2.14 (Paulus, Duties of Proconsuls 2), in 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 799
(Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 1985) (summarizing Justinian-era double jeopardy protections).
74
See MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5, 326-27 (Oxford, Clarendon Press ed.,
1969) (discussing canonical protections against double jeopardy in Middle Ages).
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lection and publication of papal decrees—the Gregorian Decretals; these
decrees proclaimed that “[a]n accusation cannot be repeated with respect to
those crimes of which the accused has been absolved.”75 Nearly a century
earlier, a Bolognese monk published an anthology work, the Decretum,
which collected scores of older church council canons, scriptural passages,
and papal decrees.76 At least two references to double jeopardy are found
in the Decretum: (1) “[t]he Scripture holds, God does not punish twice in
the same manner” and (2) “[w]hether one is condemned or absolved, there
can be no further action involving the same crime.”77 Religious writings
regarding bars to double jeopardy, however, were not limited to Christianity.78 The Talmud—a collection of rabbinical teachings and reflections on
Hebraic law—recounts the story of a Rabbi Akiba who relied upon Deuteronomy 25:2 to explain why Hebraic law “prohibited a person liable to a
death penalty by a human tribunal from also being flogged.”79
C.

English Common Law

Modern American reverence for protection against double jeopardy—coupled with a frequent desire to ground legal concepts in common
law origins—has led to overstatements about the prominence and con-

See R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 11-13, 286 (Univ. of Ga.
Press ed., 1996) (summarizing double jeopardy protections contained in Decretals) (citing
DECRETALS GREGORII IX 5.16). The chapter of the Decretals in which that proclamation appeared was accompanied by commentary wherein the principle was summarized as requiring
“anyone . . . absolved of a crime of which he is accused . . . should not again be accused of the
same thing.” Id. at 286; see also Rudstein, supra note 64, at 200-01 (summarizing Hemmholz’s
work).
76 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 201 (introducing and discussing the Decretum).
77 See Helmholz, supra note 75, at 286 (internal citations omitted) (summarizing Decretum’s
references to double jeopardy protections).
78 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 197 (discussing Jewish laws and writings about double
jeopardy principles); see also HYMAN E. GOLDIN, HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
108-09 & n.6 (1952) (explaining that “in capital cases verdicts may be reversed [from conviction]
to acquittal, but not [from acquittal] to conviction.”); SAMUEL MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS, 150 & n.358 (2d ed. 1968) (emphasis added)
(summarizing rule that “[a] verdict of conviction may be reversed by the trial court, but a verdict
of acquittal can, under no circumstances, be reversed.”)
79 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 197 (citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Makkoth 13b (Isidore
Epstein ed., H.M. Lazarus trans., 1935)) (recounting Talmud’s summary of Rabbi Akiba’s pronouncements). Rabbi Akiba interpreted that verse of Deuteronomy to hold that “you make [the
guilty man] liable to punishment for one misdeed, but you cannot hold him liable [in multiple
ways] for two misdeeds.” Id.; GEORGE HOROWITZ, 1 THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 170 (1953)
(clarifying Rabbi Akiba’s interpretation). Put another way, this has been taken to mean that “for
one offense, only one punishment might be inflicted.” Horowitz, supra note 79, at 170.
75
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sistency of such protections throughout historical English jurisprudence.80
Such overstatements are misleading, however, since there is more than
scant evidence that the earliest English rulers after the Norman Conquest
had little, if any regard for questions of double jeopardy protection.81 After
later jurisdictional battles with the church led Henry II to loosen his stranglehold on criminal trials and to accept, as final, more ecclesiastical court
acquittals, a general protection against double jeopardy still did not exist in
England.82 Contrary to the reverential proclamation made in Felch, no
such reference existed in the Magna Carta—which King John originally issued in 1215, and was then reaffirmed by King Edward I before the turn of
the thirteenth century.83
This state of affairs persisted beyond the time of the early Norman
rulers and was a feature of reigns throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries.84 One of the primary reasons for this halting progress was that
much of Anglo-Saxon criminal law was fully dependent upon private actors initiating suits.85 Even when criminal law enforcement shifted away
from individuals to a state prerogative and attendant recognition of double
jeopardy arose, such recognitions were negative in their treatment of the
80 See State v. Felch, 105 A. 23, 25 (Vt. 1918) (describing protection against double jeopardy
as “of such importance that it was given a place in the Magna Charta [sic], and that it was regarded [as] so vital to the maintenance of the Anglo-Saxon concept of individual liberty.”)
81 See Sigler, supra note 64, at 286 (recounting example of monarchical flaunting of double
jeopardy protections). “In one situation, William [II] tried fifty Englishmen by the ordeal of hot
iron. Since they escaped unhurt, they were, of course, acquitted; upon which the monarch ‘declared he would try them again by the judgment of his court, and would not abide by the pretend
judgment of God.’” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also 1 JOHN REEVES, REEVES’ HISTORY
OF THE ENGLISH LAW, FROM THE TIME OF THE ROMANS, TO THE END OF THE REIGN OF
ELIZABETH 456 (W.F. Finlason ed., 1869) (discussing monarchical ability to override prosecutorial outcomes); Rudstein, supra note 64, at 209 (citing The Charter of Liberties of Henry I (1101),
reprinted in MICHAEL EVANS & R. IAN JACK, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 49-50 (1984) (noting complete lack of double jeopardy protections in
Henry I’s Charter of Liberties); JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 4 (1969) (deeming it likely that “[protections against] double jeopardy w[ere] not so fundamental a privilege” in early English law).
82 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 204-10 (discussing slow development of English double
jeopardy protections); Sigler, supra note 64, at 291-92 (cataloguing extent of references to double
jeopardy in twelfth and thirteenth-century English legal works). Indeed, the earliest treatise on
the common law—written in the latter stages of the twelfth century—contains no reference to
protections against double jeopardy. Sigler, supra note 64, at 291-92.
83 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 210 (summarizing state of double jeopardy protections in
thirteenth century).
84 See Sigler, supra note 64, at 287-95 (examining slow evolution of English recognition of
double jeopardy protections).
85 See id. at 288 (“[D]ouble jeopardy involves a limitation upon the power of the state to
bring suit . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN, The Anglo-Saxon Legal
Procedure, in 1 ESSAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW 183, 283-84 (1905) (discussing weak protections
against double jeopardy afforded to accused parties against private complainants).
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principle.86 These negative recognitions were at least partially responsible
for the sixteenth century being seen as a “‘dark period’ in the development
of rules prohibiting double jeopardy.”87
The truly modern common law approach to double jeopardy did
not begin to emerge until the latter half of the seventeenth century.88 By
this time, however, English courts addressed several double jeopardy issues
and began to consistently uphold its protections.89 From the 1660s onward,
the King’s Bench generally expanded and solidified protections afforded
through the prohibition against double jeopardy.90 The pedestal upon
which the protections had been placed were such that the King’s Bench
found that an acquittal in another country prevented subsequent domestic
prosecution for the same alleged offense.91 All the while, the King’s Bench
was also active in eradicating trial judge practices that tended to undermine
and prevent the invocation of double jeopardy protections.92 Moreover, by
the latter half of the eighteenth century, the common double jeopardy pleas
of autrefois acquit (“previously acquitted”), autrefois convict (“previously
See Sigler, supra note 64, at 288 (introducing early English recognition of double jeopardy
principles). During the reign of Henry VII (1485-1509), a statute was adopted providing that capital indictments could be initiated immediately at the king’s urging, without any delay provided
for an appeal. Id. The statute also provided that the older plea of autrefois acquit—essentially,
“previously acquitted”—commonly invoked by defendants, would not prevent the appeal of an
acquittal. Id. Another statute passed just two years into Henry VII’s reign further codified the
common law’s nearly complete disregard for the notion of protection against double jeopardy; it
provided that “neither a conviction nor an acquittal on an indictment acted as a bar to a prosecution by way of appeal, for the same offense, if the appeal was brought within a year and a day.”
Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
87 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 217 (analyzing long-term effects and ramifications of Henry VII-era enactments). For instance, a statute enacted in 1534 permitted those acquitted of felonies in Wales to nevertheless be tried for the same felony in the adjacent English county within
two years of the alleged offense. Id. (citing Jill Hunter, The Development of the Rule Against
Double Jeopardy, 5 J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 12 (1984)).
88
See Sigler, supra note 81, at 9 (charting emergence of modern English double jeopardy
rules). Sigler notes that, by this time, prosecutions by the crown (i.e., the state) had begun replacing private prosecutions by appeal as the preferred means of conducting criminal prosecutions,
thereby fulfilling the prerequisite of “the state’s . . . power to institute suit . . . [for] a true double
jeopardy situation.” Id.
89 See Turner’s Case, (1664) 84 Eng. Rep. 1068 (K.B.) (holding defendant’s acquittal for
burglary prevented subsequent prosecution under indictment charging him with same burglary);
see also Jones & Bever, (1665) 84 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B.) (holding defendants’ acquittals for burglary prevented subsequent prosecution for that and another burglary).
90 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 219 (summarizing notable King’s Bench decisions from
this period). For example, one prominent case held that prosecutors were prevented from seeking
new trials following an acquittal. Id. (citing The King v. Read, (1660) 83 Eng. Rep. 271 (K.B.)).
91 See Rex v. Hutchinson, (1667) 84 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B.) (holding Hutchinson’s prior acquittal for murder in Portugal barred prosecution in England for same killing).
92
See The King v. Perkins, (1698) 90 Eng. Rep. 1122 (K.B.) (prohibiting trial judge practice
of discharging juries when acquittals appeared imminent).
86
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convicted”), and pardon were well established in English common law.93
The permanence of these protections by this time was such that Blackstone
wrote about them in his landmark treatise on the laws of England.94
D.

American Development & Codification

Protections against double jeopardy emerged in the colonies during
the mid-seventeenth century.95 For example, in 1639, Maryland’s General
Assembly enacted the Act for the Liberties of the People, which some categorized as “the first American Bill of Rights.”96 The first colonial enactment to contain an express protection against double jeopardy followed
shortly thereafter.97 With its 1648 enactment of the Laws and Liberties,
Massachusetts continued its commitment to protection against double jeopardy.98 Other colonies provided similar versions of protections against
double jeopardy at this time as well.99 In the aftermath of the RevolutionSee Rudstein, supra note 64, at 220-21 (concluding trace of double jeopardy evolution at
common law).
94 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 335 (1770)
(noting “universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for [the] same offence.”)
95 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 221-23 (summarizing early colonial protections against
double jeopardy).
96 See id. at 221 (quoting 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 67 (1971)) (noting Maryland’s enactment); MARYLAND ACT FOR THE LIBERTIES OF
THE PEOPLE (1639), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 68 (1971) (discussing statute’s protections against double jeopardy).
While the Act for the Liberties of the People did not contain any express protections against double jeopardy, it did reaffirm the principle that non-slave inhabitants of the colony would “have
and enjoy all such rights liberties immunities priviledges [sic] and customs . . . as any naturall
[sic] born subject of England hath or ought to have or enjoy . . .” Schwartz, supra note 96, at 68.
97 See Schwartz, supra note 96, at 71 (summarizing Massachusetts’ Body of Liberties);
MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES para. 42 (1641), reprinted in RICHARD L. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 153 (1959) (presenting Massachusetts’s protections against
double jeopardy). Paragraph 42 of Massachusetts’s 1641 Body of Liberties provided that “[n]o
man shall be twise [sic] sentenced by Civil Justice for one and the same Crime, offence, or Trespasse [sic].” Perry, supra note 87, at 153.
98 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 221-22 (introducing Massachusetts’ codifications of protections against double jeopardy). The Laws and Liberties contained not only the double jeopardy provision from the earlier Body of Liberties, but also provided that “everie [sic] Action between partie [sic] and partie [sic] and proceedings against delinquents in criminal Causes shall
be . . . entered in the rolls of [everie] [sic] Court by the Recorder thereof, that such Actions be not
afterwards brought again to the vexation of any man.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
99 See id. (discussing colonial examples of double jeopardy protections). For example, the
Connecticut Code of 1652 included a clause providing that “no Person shall be twice sentenced
by Civil Justice for one and the same Crime . . . .” Id. (citing Christopher Collier, The Common
Law and Individual Rights in Connecticut Before the Federal Bill of Rights, 76 CONN. B.J. 1, 12
(2002)); see also THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS OF CAROLINA para. 64 (1669), reprinted
93
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ary War and as the colonies became states and formed a national union, the
colonial-era protections against double jeopardy faded from view—albeit
briefly.100 New Hampshire was the first state constitution to include an express protection against double jeopardy.101 Following independence, numerous states were also acknowledging protections against double jeopardy
through case law.102
After the failures of the Articles of Confederation, the First Congress convened on March 4, 1789, to devise a new national document.103
On June 8th, James Madison introduced a series of proposed constitutional
amendments, including those that ultimately became the Bill of Rights.104
On August 17th, House members, sitting as a Committee of the Whole,
took up debate on the clause prohibiting double jeopardy, which, by then,
read: “No person shall be subject, except in case of impeachment, to more
than one trial or one punishment for the same offence.”105 Two days later,
the entire House began consideration of the proposed amendments; and on

in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2780 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (noting document drafted,
but never enacted, providing that “[n]o cause shall be twice tried in any one court, upon any reason or pretence [sic] whatsoever”).
100 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 222-23 (discussing post-Revolution developments).
America’s initial guiding document, the Articles of Confederation, contained neither a Bill of
Rights nor an express protection against double jeopardy. Id. at 222 (citing ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. IV (1778)). Most emerging state constitutions similarly lacked express
guarantees against double jeopardy, although some did implicitly provide such protections by
calling for the automatic enforcement of English common law absent statutory provisions to the
contrary. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 25 (“The common law of England . . . shall remain
in force, unless [it] shall be altered by a future law of the legislature . . . .”); N.J. CONST. of 1776
para. XXII (“[T]he common law of England . . . as [has] been heretofore practised [sic] in this
Colony, shall still remain in force, until [it] shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature
. . . .”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777 para. XXXV (“[T]he common law of England . . . shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State
shall, from time to time, make concerning the same.”).
101 See N.H. CONST. of 1784, Part I, art. XVI (providing that “[n]o subject shall be liable to
be tried, after an acquittal, for the same crime or offence”).
102 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 223-26 (cataloguing state court decisions responsible for
recognizing protections against double jeopardy).
103 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 257 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recounting history of Constitutional Convention).
104 See id. (summarizing Madison’s proposals). Madison’s original proposal for double
jeopardy protection stated that “[n]o person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment or one trial for the same offence . . . .” Id.
105 See id. at 451-52 (summarizing House consideration of Madison’s proposed double jeopardy provision). A representative from New York objected to the “one trial or” language, arguing
that the guarantee against double jeopardy was intended to prevent more than one punishment for
a single offense, not, as that language suggested, to prevent an individual convicted in his first
trial from challenging that conviction. Id.
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August 21st, it adopted Madison’s provision containing the double jeopardy protection, referring it the following day to a committee of representatives to send to the Senate.106 The Senate took up the proposed constitutional amendments on September 2nd, and began its consideration of the
double jeopardy clause two days later.107 Further edits to the clause’s language were made, with the “by any public prosecution” provision eliminated; on September 9th, the Senate approved the version of the clause that
exists today.108 After the House approved the Senate’s revisions, and Madison’s proposals were submitted to the states, the Double Jeopardy Clause
became part of the Fifth Amendment following sufficient state ratification
in 1791.109
E.

Modern American Jurisprudence: Incorporation

As originally written, the protections embodied in the Bill of
Rights were applicable only against the federal government and the process
of enforcing the rights therein against the states— through incorporation—
only began in earnest in the early twentieth century.110 Consequently, for
long stretches of American history “the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment did not prohibit a state from placing an individual in
jeopardy twice for the same offense.”111 The Supreme Court did not address whether due process of law protected an individual from exposure to
double jeopardy at the state level until 1902.112 This issue was not in front
of the Court again for over a quarter century, until Palko v. Connecticut.113
See id. at 795 (recounting House adoption of proposed double jeopardy provision).
See S.J. 1ST CONG., 1ST SESS., 19 (1789) (recounting Senate’s consideration of proposed
double jeopardy provision). The Senate eventually struck the words “except in case of impeachment, to more than one trial, or one punishment,” and inserted the phrase “be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb by any public prosecution.” Id. at 21, 98.
108
See 1 STAT. 98 (1789) (noting Senate edits to double jeopardy provision).
109 See id. (explaining ratification process and enshrinement of Double Jeopardy Clause).
110 See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 254-57 (1982)
(recounting early attempts to incorporate and failures of those attempts).
111 Rudstein, supra note 64, at 233 (noting pre-incorporation limitations upon Double Jeopardy Clause protections).
112 See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1902) (disregarding due process claims to find
retrial following mistrial did not implicate double jeopardy); see also Rudstein, supra note 64, at
235 (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court did not . . . consider the merits of Dreyer’s claim.”)
113 See 302 U.S. 319, 323-24 (1937) (summarizing twentieth-century double jeopardy jurisprudence), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). Connecticut charged
Frank Palko with murder in the first degree, and a jury later convicted him of murder in the second degree. Id. at 320-21. Following that conviction, the trial judge sentenced Palko to life imprisonment. Id. at 321. Pursuant to a state statute, Connecticut appealed, claiming that the judge
made legal errors prejudicial to the prosecution, including his jury instructions regarding the differences between first and second-degree murder. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
106
107
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Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo held that Palko’s second trial for the
same offense did not deprive him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.114 The issue arose again just sixteen years later, and
once again, the Court held that a second trial after an initial mistrial did not
subject a defendant to jeopardy twice for the same offense.115 In Brock, the
Court stressed the importance of justice being properly served and the fact
that—under the Double Jeopardy Clause—there has been a “long favored
rule of discretion in the trial judge to declare a mistrial and to require another panel to try the defendant if the ends of justice will be best served.”116
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren in the 1960s,
however, the Supreme Court radically altered its approach when considering the interactions between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.117 This revolution was sparked by Mapp v.
Ohio, in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause allows for the selective incorporation of various provisions
from the first eight amendments and makes those provisions fully applicable to the states.118 By using this approach, the Warren Court incorporated
a host of key constitutional protections against the states in the context of
criminal prosecutions.119 As such, in 1969, the question of whether the
reversed Palko’s second-degree murder conviction and ordered that he be tried again for firstdegree murder. State v. Palko, 186 A. 657, 662 (Conn. 1936). Palko claimed that a new trial
would subject him to double jeopardy for the same offense, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Palko, 302 U.S. at 321. The trial judge rejected Palko’s claim and allowed the retrial to proceed. Id. at 321. After the conclusion of the retrial, the jury convicted Palko of firstdegree murder and sentenced him to death. Id. at 321-22.
114 See Palko, 302 U.S. at 328 (rejecting Palko’s argument that Fourteenth Amendment due
process embodies Fifth Amendment protections). After reviewing prior cases, the Court held that
the rights encompassed by due process of law—as applicable against the states—were those “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at 325. Pursuant to that analysis, the Court reasoned
that permitting the government to appeal perceived errors of law would not subject a defendant to
“a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it.” Id. at 328. The Court further reasoned that allowing the government to appeal those potential errors of law would not “violate those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions.’” Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
115 See Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1953) (rejecting argument that defendant being presented for trial before second jury violates due process).
116 Id. at 427-28 (finding that process of presenting defendant to new jury for retrial “does
not deny the fundamental essentials of a trial . . . .”).
117 See Rudstein, supra note 64, at 238-39 (introducing jurisprudential shift); see also Corinna Barret Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the
Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1362-65 (2004) (summarizing Warren
Court’s reputation for expanding criminal procedure rights through incorporation).
118 See 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961) (incorporating Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule
against states).
119 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating Sixth Amendment’s right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (incorporating Sixth
Amendment’s right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina,
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applied the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause to the states was ripe for renewed examination, and was answered affirmatively in Benton v. Maryland.120 Writing for
the majority, Justice Marshall noted that “[i]n an increasing number of cases, the Court ‘ha[d] rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights . . . .’”121 The majority opinion continued
by referencing the extensive incorporation of criminal due process rights
earlier in the decade:
Our recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion
that basic constitutional rights can be denied by the States
as long as the totality of the circumstances does not disclose a denial of “fundamental fairness.” Once it is decided
that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is “fundamental
to the American scheme of justice,” the same constitutional
standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.122
In concluding, Justice Marshall wrote eloquently about how the
Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy “represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage.”123
F.

Modern American Jurisprudence: Emergence Of The Exception

While the Exception has been most commonly invoked postBenton, its theoretical origins have much older roots.124 Indeed, the notion
of the states retaining at least a modicum of their own sovereignty is a prin-

386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (incorporating Sixth Amendment’s right to speedy trial); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (incorporating Sixth Amendment’s right to confront witnesses);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (incorporating Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (incorporating
Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment).
120 See 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (finding Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to states
through Fourteenth Amendment).
121 Id. at 794 (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11) (noting Warren-era shift in Court’s approach to determining fundamental nature of Bill of Rights guarantees).
122 Id. at 795 (emphasis added) (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149) (recognizing “the inevitab[ility]” of finding protections against double jeopardy “fundamental to American scheme of
justice”).
123
See id. at 794 (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 329 (1937)).
124 See Dawson, supra note 8, at 289-95 (summarizing history of dual sovereignty).
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ciple at the heart of the United States’ system of federalism.125 Unhelpfully, both Federalist writings and the Constitution itself left open the question
of laws concerning duplication, or situations in which both the federal and
state governments enact identical laws.126 Addressing this problem therefore fell to the courts, and in 1820 the Supreme Court adopted a doctrine
whereby anytime the federal government enacted legislation directed at the
same subject as a state law, the federal law would supersede the state enactment.127 Similar views were espoused nearly thirty years later, when
Justice McLean declared that “[a] concurrent power in two distinct sovereignties to regulate the same thing is as inconsistent in principle as it is impracticable in action [and it] involves a moral and physical impossibility.”128 At roughly the same time, though, states were actively pushing the
notion that “since they had jurisdiction over offenses committed within
their boundaries, they could not be deprived of [such jurisdiction] by the
mere enactment of a federal statute on the same subject.”129 The states
were rewarded for their efforts, as the Supreme Court quickly became involved and endorsed the dual sovereignty theory being advanced.130 The

125 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (addressing anti-Federalist
concerns regarding consolidation of states into United States).

An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty, would
imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them,
would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention
aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that
act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States.
Id. (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to states “powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states”).
126 See Harlan R. Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustration of
Human Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 306, 309 (1963) (introducing theory of concurrent jurisdiction and problems associated therewith).
127 See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 21-22 (1820) (holding that states cannot
enter upon same ground and punish for same transgressions as Congress).
128 See Smith v. Turner (“The Passenger Cases”), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 399 (1849) (reaffirming principles regarding federal laws nullifying state laws).
129 See Harrison, supra note 126, at 311 (introducing origins of claims to dual sovereignty).
130 See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19-21 (1852) (emphasis added) (rejecting defendant’s argument that punishment under Illinois law was improper due to supersession by
federal law because “[a]n offence . . . means the transgression of a law”); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 569 (1850) (emphasis added) (“ [T]he same act might, as to its character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an offence against both the
State and Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by
either . . . .”); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 435 (1847) (emphasis added) (“[O]ffences [sic]
falling within the competency of different authorities to restrain or punish them . . . [are] subjected to those consequences which those authorities might ordain and affix to their perpetration.”)
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jurisprudential reasoning that emerged in this era is best encapsulated in a
decision from 1852.131
Thus, the early seeds of dual sovereignty were firmly planted, and
the Supreme Court— some seventy years later—was comfortable invoking
the Exception to permit federal prosecution following a state prosecution
and conviction for the same underlying action.132 Relying on scores of prior cases, in 1922 the Lanza Court averred that “[i]t follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense
against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each.”133
The Court reaffirmed these principles in two mid-twentieth century cases
notably decided on the same day.134
IV. ANALYSIS
The Gamble decision—as it represents a major endorsement of the
continued existence of the Exception—is and will remain wrongly decided
unless it is overturned.135 Under that pretext, the following sections will
offer compelling reasons to, finally, eliminate the Exception.

131

See Moore, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 20 (summarizing notion of dual sovereignty).

The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both [a state and the
United States . . . .] That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender,
cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for
each of which he is justly punishable.
Id. (emphasis added).
132
See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (finding that defendants committed
two distinct, sovereign-specific offenses through same underlying act).
133 See id. at 382-84 (cataloguing numerous decisions affirming dual-sovereignty principles)
(emphasis added); see also Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 236 U.S. 439, 445 (1915)
(noting that “punishment by one [sovereign] does not prevent punishment by the other.”)
134 See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 193-96 (1959) (holding federal prosecution
following state conviction does not violate due process of law); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 138-39 (1959) (holding state prosecution following federal acquittal does not violate
due process of law).
135 See Robert Barnes, In Ruling with Implications for Trump’s Pardon Power, Supreme
Court Continues to Allow State and Federal Prosecutions for Same Offense, WASH. POST (June
17, 2019, 4:48 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-courtreaffirms-precedent-that-allows-state-and-federal-prosecutions-for-the-sameoffense/2019/06/17/aed18054-9106-11e9-b570-6416efdc0803_story.html (noting Exception “exposes defendants to the potential harassment, trauma, expense and sometimes extra punishment
the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause was designed to prevent”).
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The Exception Undermines Popular Sovereignty

In the United States, there has long existed the notion that “[t]he
power of the people lies at the foundation of American government.”136
Similar notions were also espoused by the Federalist authors, Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison, and foreign observers.137 More modern endorsements of this line of thinking exist as well.138 The continued existence of the Exception is an affront to the power granted to the federal and
state governments by the people, who, when they “assigned different aspects of their sovereign power . . . sought not to multiply governmental
power but to limit it.”139 Additionally, the Exception makes a mockery of
the people’s popular sovereignty that undergirds the Double Jeopardy
Clause and the protections it purports to afford.140 Since the exercise of the
people’s ultimate sovereignty is to be final and, crucially, unappealable, the
permission that the Exception grants the states and the federal government
to successively prosecute an individual for the same underlying transgression undoubtedly represents an intrusion upon and disregard for that popular sovereignty.141

136 Dawson, supra note 8, at 282 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (analyzing
principle of popular sovereignty); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776) (supporting notion of popular sovereignty). Such beliefs were manifest in the text of the
Declaration of Independence, which states that “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed[.]” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (emphasis added); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404-05 (1819). Additionally, in
1819, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that “[t]he government of the Union . . . is, emphatically
and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them . . . .” McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
137 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (defining a constitutionally-created republic as a
government “which derives all its power directly or indirectly from the great body of the people”); 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55 (Phillips Bradley ed. 1945)
(“Whenever the political laws of the United States are to be discussed, it is with the doctrine of
the sovereignty of the people that we must begin.”)
138 See Arizona State Leg. v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 820
(2015) (explaining that people possess “ultimate sovereignty”); see also Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 540-41 (1969) (quoting 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 257 (J. Elliot
ed. 1876)) (“[T]he true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please
to govern them . . . .”)
139 See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 2000 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of invoking federalism to threaten individual liberty).
140 See Dawson, supra note 8, at 299 (calling Exception “unconstitutional”).
141 See id. at 284 (discussing Exception’s denigration of popular sovereignty); see also
JAMES WILSON, 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 201(Liberty Fund, Kermit L. Hall &
Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (cataloguing remarks made at Constitutional Convention).
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Further, the logic underlying one of the main defenses of the exception—namely, that popular sovereignty is not denigrated by a second
prosecution because the latter prosecution is before a different sovereign—
crumbles under the slightest scrutiny.142 At its core, this defense posits
that, while the American people are indeed sovereign, they are also the representatives of two sovereigns simultaneously—their state government and
the federal government.143 In the context of successive prosecutions permitted by the Exception, the proponents of this defense assert that juries sitting in a state court “will represent the people of the state while the very
same jurors empaneled across the street in a federal court house will represent the people of the United States.”144 What this defense suggests, then,
is the rather implausible notion that somehow, “a collection of citizens empaneled in a state courthouse is different in kind from a collection of citizens empaneled across the street in a federal courthouse.”145 Such a notion
is highly incompatible with the concept of popular sovereignty, under
which “the federal and state governments are but two expressions of a single and sovereign people.”146 Proponents of the Exception–especially
those who defend it against the accusation that it usurps popular sovereignty–miss the crucial point that the Constitution itself provides protection and
even enhancement of the people’s popular sovereignty.147
Upon what principle is it contended that the sovereign power resides in the state governments? The honorable gentleman has said truly, that there can be no subordinate
sovereignty. Now, if there cannot, my position is, that sovereignty resides in the people; they have not parted with it . . . [T]he proposed system sets out with a declaration
that its existence depends upon the supreme authority of the people alone.
Id. (emphasis added).
142 See Dawson, supra note 8, at 301 (responding to defense of Exception).
143 See id. (explaining defense).
144 See id. at 301-02 (summarizing logic underlying Exception defense).
145 See id. at 301 (questioning substance of Exception defense).
146 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1999 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (criticizing majority’s assertions regarding possession of ultimate sovereignty).
147 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . .”) “[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In practice, this
defense proposes that in cases like Gamble’s, the jurors in his state trial were representing and
protecting exclusively Alabama’s interests, while the jurors in his federal trial were representing
and protecting exclusively the federal government’s interests. See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1998
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (expressing skepticism that trials before different sovereigns are particularly distinct). However, such a proposition ignores the fact that jurors in both trials were drawn
from the same population, across comparable areas. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1998 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); Dawson, supra note 8, at 301-02 (questioning “[d]iehard dual sovereigntists’” de-
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The undermining effect that the Exception wreaks on popular sovereignty is especially pernicious when a successive prosecution is brought
after an initial acquittal because one of the most direct and powerful ways
in which the people exert and express their collective sovereignty is by
serving on juries, where they serve as a final, unassailable check on governmental power.148 Placement of the Double Jeopardy Clause into the
greater Bill of Rights context underscores this point, insofar as three Bill of
Rights Amendments are expressly concerned with juries.149 Pursuant to
each of these rights and guarantees, juries—as the people’s representative—act as what one scholar memorably describes as “populist protectors.”150 The Constitution imbues the people with the power to exert their
collective sovereignty with finality against the power and authority of the
government, and to hold the government to extremely high standards in jury trials.151 The Exception assaults this power, and removes the finality
that should otherwise be inherent in a jury’s initial acquittal, thereby usurping and weakening the people’s popular sovereignty.152 Indeed, some
scholars have argued that the Exception’s effect of usurping the people’s
nullification power alone is sufficient to find the Exception unconstitutional.153 A subsequent prosecution by a separate government—following an
acquittal in a prior prosecution by another government—evinces disrespect
fense of Exception). This defense of Exception is also highly theoretical, and offers little solace
to those concerned with practical considerations, including how a juror goes about expressly representing and protecting the interests of one sovereign to the exclusion of another. Dawson, supra note 8, at 301-02.
148 See Robert Matz, Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: If at First You
Don’t Convict, Try, Try Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 374 (1997) (discussing juror ability
to nullify governmental power and will); see also De Tocqueville, supra note 137, at 282-83
(highlighting how juries amplify people’s sovereignty).
149 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (establishing requirement of grand jury’s involvement in
criminal cases); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing right to jury in criminal trials); U.S.
CONST. amend. VII (providing for right to jury in certain civil cases).
150 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183-85
(1991) (discussing important role juries play).
151 See id. (underlining crucial role juries play in checking governmental power).
152 See Matz, supra note 148, at 374 n.127 (summarizing arguments that Exception is unconstitutional due to usurpation of jury nullification power); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 317 n.10 (1979) (noting that “the factfinder in a criminal case has traditionally been permitted to enter an unassailable but unreasonable verdict of ‘not guilty.’”)
153 See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 8, at 299 (calling Exception “unconstitutional because it
denigrates the principle of popular sovereignty underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Robert
C. Gorman, The Second Rodney King Trial: Justice in Jeopardy?, 27 AKRON L. REV. 57, 72
(1994) (summarizing arguments positing unconstitutionality of Exception); Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 130 (1978)
(noting that “Double Jeopardy Clause . . . allows [a] jury to exercise its constitutional function as
the conscience of the community in applying the law: to soften, and in the extreme case, to nullify
the application of the law in order to avoid unjust judgments.”)
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for and disregard of perhaps the purest and most powerful expression of
popular sovereignty against the government.154
B.

The Dual Sovereigns Exception Is Patently Unfair To Criminal
Defendants

The protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, including the
Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, were enshrined in the Constitution to “further guard[] . . . public liberty & individual rights.”155 The
Bill of Rights is premised on protecting the liberty interests of the people
against governmental overreach and intrusion, and yet one of the most notable protections contained therein—the guarantee against double jeopardy—is consistently undermined by the Exception and its “failure to consider the liberty interests of the accused.”156 This undermining is rendered
particularly offensive given the respect the Supreme Court routinely affords
other Bill of Rights guarantees.157
The Court’s commitment to its understanding of federalism blatantly ignores the clear concern expressed in the Bill of Rights about placing individuals in a vulnerable position against a powerful government.158
When the people sacrificed parts of their inherent sovereign power as citizens of states to the federal government, they did so with the belief that
“[b]y denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism [would] protect[] the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.”159 In practice, though, the preservation of the Ex-

154 See Dawson, supra note 8, at 299 (“Having invited the popular will to check its authority,
government may not simply disregard it and try again.”)
155 See 25 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS: MARCH 1, 1788 - JULY 25, 1789 427
(Paul H. Smith ed., 1988) (reprinting Oct. 1788 letter from Madison to Jefferson regarding Madison’s views on Bill of Rights); See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 448-60 (1789) (quoting Madison’s
speech introducing Bill of Rights). Indeed, at its inception the Bill of Rights was recognized as
designed to “limit and qualify the powers of Government.” See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. at 448-60.
156 See Gorman, supra note 153, at 72 (noting common critique of Exception).
157 See id. at 73-74 (discussing generally broad interpretation of individual rights and liberties); see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (“It has been repeatedly decided
that [the Bill of Rights] should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of the rights.”)
158 See Gorman, supra note 153, at 72 (criticizing Court’s “adher[ence] to its formalistic theory [of] federalism” in Heath); see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985) (discussing
use of balancing test). In fact, the Heath Court explicitly rejected calls to adopt a balancing test
under which the liberty interests of the accused would be weighed against the government’s interest in obtaining justice in a second prosecution. Heath, 474 U.S. at 92.
159 See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (explaining that unconstrained governmental power threatens liberty of people); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1774, 653-54 (1833) (“The great object of a trial by
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ception permits the Court to invoke federalism in order to brush aside individual liberty interests and, instead, threaten those interests by empowering
distinct governments to achieve in tandem what each alone could not do
alone.160
The Exception—such that it permits governments to subject criminal defendants to multiple judicial proceedings—is antithetical to the
Court’s own recognition that being charged with and prosecuted for criminal activity exposes a defendant to “embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compel[s] him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhance[s] the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty.”161 The successive prosecutions the Exception permits exacerbate these effects and, most perniciously, increase the likelihood that an
innocent defendant may be wrongfully convicted.162 At its core, the Double Jeopardy Clause is designed to prohibit governments from working together to repeatedly harass a criminal defendant for a single act or transaction; however, this is a reality that the Exception allows and implicitly
encourages in the name of justice.163 The continued ability that state and
federal governments have to successively prosecute an individual for the
same underlying act or transaction gives both “an illegitimate dress rehearsal of its case and a cheat peek at the defense.”164 Accordingly, the
Exception is not defensible pursuant to an argument that a second prosecujury in criminal cases, is to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of the rulers . . . .”)
160 See Mark E. Lewis, The Conflict Between Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy, 38
ALA. L. REV. 153, 159 (1986) (reacting to Heath decision). Lewis opined that the Heath Court
“[r]ather than seeing federalism as a means to protect individual interests and to provide insurance against an arbitrary government . . . viewed federalism as an end itself to be achieved at the
expense of individual rights.” Id.
161 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (recognizing hardships inherent
to being criminally prosecuted).
162 See Brief of Constitutional Accountability Center, CATO Institute, American Civil Liberties Union, and American Civil Liberties Union of Alabama as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) (No. 17-646) [hereinafter Amici Curiae] (articulating how Exception undermines Double Jeopardy Clause’s ability to safeguard
individual liberty); see also Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 117-18 (2009) (quoting
Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88) (describing protection against double jeopardy as designed to shield
individuals from “continuing state of anxiety and insecurity” that would flow from government,
“with all its resources and power,” being able to “make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense”).
163 See Amici Curiae, supra note 162, at 22 (noting possibility of successive prosecutions
being “especially acute in light of the increased federal-state cooperation in fighting crime”).
164 See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1995) (praising Justice Black’s Bartkus and Abbate dissents for refusing to allow such situations); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (averring
that Double Jeopardy Clause theoretically protects against government “treat[ing] the first trial as
no more than a dry run for the second prosecution”).
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tion, like the previous one, would be tried before a jury and thus subject to
an instrument of popular control.165 In fact, this line of arguing is flawed
on two counts, for not only does it disregard the requirement that an exercise of popular sovereignty be final and unassailable, but it also critically
overlooks how a second trial heavily favors the prosecution.166
One of the key protections that is meant to mitigate against such
unfairness is the prosecution exception promulgated by the Bartkus
Court.167 In reality, however, that exception is particularly narrow, if not a
sham in its own right.168 Perhaps most alarming is the fact that many of
these claims are rejected and dismissed even in circumstances strongly indicative of the presence of a sham prosecution, such as a notable case
where a federal prosecutor was listed as a state’s witness and an FBI agent
testified for the state prosecution.169 Incredibly, a sham prosecution claim
was rejected, even where a state initiated criminal proceedings against a defendant at the behest of federal authorities and the same federal authorities
See Dawson, supra note 8, at 300 (articulating flaws in such an argument).
See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1999 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(questioning draconian nature of Exception with respect to Gamble’s case).
165
166

Imagine trying to explain the Court’s [Exception] to a criminal defendant . . . Yes, you
were sentenced to state prison for being a felon in possession of a firearm. And don’t
worry–the State can’t prosecute you again. But a federal prosecutor can send you to
prison again for exactly the same thing. What’s more, the federal prosecutor may work
hand-in-hand with the same state prosecutor who already went after you. They can
share evidence and discuss what worked and what didn’t the first time around. And the
federal prosecutor can pursue you even if you were acquitted in the state case. None of
that offends the Constitution’s plain words protecting a person from being placed
“twice . . . in jeopardy of life or limb” for “the same offence.” Really?
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
167 See supra text accompanying note 6 (summarizing ‘sham prosecution’ loophole to Exception).
168 See Dawson, supra note 8, at 296 (criticizing ineffectiveness of sham prosecution exception). Claims of impermissible exposure to double jeopardy predicated on the sham prosecution
exception survive appeal in only the rarest of circumstances; however, more often than not, these
claims are dismissed outright. Id. nn.110, 113, 116 (listing examples of rejections of sham prosecution claims); see also United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
idea that mere “cooperation between prosecutorial sovereignties” is automatically sufficient to
invoke sham prosecution exception); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 164-66 (1959) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (questioning majority’s refusal to remand on sham prosecution question in face of
extensive federal-state cooperation).
169 See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979) (deeming “[l]aw enforcement cooperation between state and federal authorities . . . a welcome invitation.”); see also
Bernhardt, 831 F.2d at 183 (escribing another instance of sham prosecution claim). In another
case, a defendant’s sham prosecution claim was rejected despite the fact that a deputy state attorney general was deputized to the Department of Justice as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney and
granted responsibility for the federal prosecution while still collecting his state salary. Bernhardt,
831 F.2d at 183.
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sat with the state prosecution at trial, testified as witnesses, collected evidence for the state’s case, postponed sentencing a prosecution witness until
after he testified for the state, helped in witness preparation, and appointed
the state prosecutor to the position of Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney
for the subsequent federal prosecution.170 The flimsy protection that the
sham prosecution exception appears to offer criminal defendants is rendered even weaker because its very existence is often doubted.171
Finally, the continued existence of the Exception and the ability it
gives to the state and federal governments to try their cases one after the
other, often gives rise to other violations of criminal defendants’ constitutional rights.172 Such violations are particularly likely where a federal
prosecution follows a state prosecution, because a lengthy delay in the initiation of the federal prosecution implicates a defendant’s right to a speedy
trial under the Sixth Amendment.173 These delays also implicate protections extended to defendants under the Speedy Trial Act,174 and the discretionary power granted to courts under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the event of undue delays.175 Claims made by defendants pursuant
to these interests, however, are all too frequently rejected and dismissed.176
V. CONCLUSION
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment exists to protect Americans against governmental abuse of its prosecutorial power and,
in theory, shields criminal defendants from the ordeal of repeated judicial
proceedings. The Supreme Court, however, in Gamble v. United States,
unwisely extended the life of the Exception, under which the protections
offered in the Double Jeopardy Clause are little more than illusory. Instead
of safeguarding the rights of individuals against the power and authority of

See United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1018-20 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that
“close collaboration” does not “amount[] to one government being the other’s ‘tool’ or providing
a ‘sham’ or ‘cover.’”)
171 See United States v. Patterson, 809 F.2d 244, 247 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987) (questioning whether sham prosecution exception is valid rebuttal to Exception).
172 See Matz, supra note 148, at 375 (analyzing secondary effects of Exception).
173 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”)
174 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2008) (setting time limits on various phases of criminal prosecutions).
175 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) (allowing federal courts to “dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint” due to unnecessary delay in “presenting a charge to a grand jury; filing an
information against a defendant; or bringing a defendant to trial”).
176
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30 (1972) (establishing difficulty of succeeding
on right to speedy trial violation claim).
170
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government, the Double Jeopardy Clause—as currently qualified by the
Exception—unforgivably operates as both a vehicle for state oppression
and a violation of constitutionally enshrined rights.
The continued existence of this Exception evinces a draconian misreading of: (1) centuries of history, (2) the centrality of individual rights
and liberties to the Bill of Rights, and (3) founding-era conceptions of federalism. Moreover, the Exception perpetuates a criminal justice system
that degrades and disregards the rights and dignity of criminal defendants.
The Exception is an affront to both the meaning and spirit of the Double
Jeopardy Clause and should unquestionably be overturned at the next time
of asking.
Ross Ballantyne

